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Notes 
 
Supreme Court Politics and Life Tenure: A 
Comparative Inquiry 
KEVIN COSTELLO† 
While the process of nominating and confirming justices to the U.S. Supreme Court has always 
been political in nature, the three most recent nominations of Merrick Garland, Neil Gorsuch, 
and Brett Kavanaugh illustrate the extent to which the confirmation process has become 
especially partisan. Whereas the nominations of Antonin Scalia and Ruth Bader Ginsburg each 
received broad, bipartisan support, no nominee since Stephen Breyer has received more than 
eighty votes in the Senate. Furthermore, for the first time since 2004, the economy is not the 
political issue that voters are most likely to consider “very important;” that designation now 
belongs to the composition of the Supreme Court. 
To ease the high-stakes, partisan attitudes that currently define Supreme Court confirmations, 
this Note advocates for a 28th Amendment, limiting Supreme Court tenure to eighteen-year terms. 
In doing so, it considers the experiences of countries that have similar confirmation processes but 
place limits on judicial tenure. Broadly speaking, there are two types of limits on judicial tenure. 
The first approach is that of a mandatory retirement age, which Brazil adopted in 1891. Brazil’s 
experience, which has been characterized by massive disparities in appointment power among 
the different presidents, cautions against such an approach. The second approach is that of a 
“term of years” limit. Mexico adopted fifteen-year term limits in 1994, and the results have 
generally been encouraging. However, like Brazil, there remains some disparity among various 
Mexican presidents in their appointment power, fueled in part by the limits placed on judicial 
tenure. This disparity could be remedied by adopting the eighteen-year proposal advocated by 
Professors Steven Calabresi and James Lindgren, as opposed to fifteen-year terms, as this would 
guarantee each president at least two opportunities to nominate a Justice. 
 
 † J.D. Candidate 2020, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; Senior Symposium Editor, 
Hastings Law Journal. I would like to thank Professor Radhika Rao, whose fascinating seminar in Comparative 
Constitutional Law provided the inspiration for this Note. I would also like to thank the Hastings Law Journal 
Notes team for their hard work and valuable feedback; I am particularly grateful to Andrew Klair, Bert Lathrop, 
and Alicia Ginsberg, all of whom have been correcting my (many) mistakes since 2017, when we were 1Ls in 
Manuel Inn. Finally, I would like to thank my parents for their unyielding support through the vicissitudes of 
law school life.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, there seems to be broad agreement that political 
partisanship has damaged the Supreme Court confirmation process.1 
Historically, the judiciary has been regarded as the “least dangerous” branch of 
the federal government.2 In the past, this understanding has afforded nominees 
a certain degree of insulation from the political process.3 This is not to say that 
the Senate has historically been unduly deferential to the president’s 
nominations or that the nomination process has never been political.4 However, 
the “bipartisan spirit” with which the Senate treated the nominations of Antonin 
Scalia and Ruth Bader Ginsburg has largely faded in the twenty-first century.5 
In fact, no Supreme Court nominee has received eighty votes in the Senate since 
Stephen Breyer’s confirmation in 1994.6 The trend towards more “hyper-
partisan” confirmation battles is perhaps best illustrated by the three most recent 
Supreme Court nominations.7 
In the last year of his second term, President Barack Obama nominated 
Merrick Garland to the Court after Justice Scalia’s death.8 Garland was, by all 
accounts, “well-qualified” for the job.9 Accordingly, when Senate Majority 
 
 1. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Understanding Supreme Court Confirmations, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 381, 
381–82 (2010) (“Conventional wisdom says that the confirmation process for Supreme Court Justices is now 
terribly broken. . . . The common refrain is that ‘if only we could get back to the way we did things in the past, 
the process would be so much better.’”).  
 2. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 3. See, e.g., Joel K. Goldstein, Choosing Justices: How Presidents Decide, 26 J.L. & POL. 425, 488–89 
(2011) (“There were no hearings to consider the nominations of Byrnes, Rutledge and Burton in the 1940s and 
1950s; the Senate spent only one day and between 23 and 58 pages of hearings on the nominations of Minton, 
Whittaker, Byron White[,] and Fortas (1965). Even the nominations of Burger in 1969 and Blackmun in 1970 
required a single day and only 116 and 134 pages respectively.”). 
 4. See, e.g., Andrew Glass, Senate Rejects Chief Justice Nominee, Dec. 15, 1795, POLITICO (Dec. 15, 
2016, 12:01 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/senate-rejects-chief-justice-nominee-dec-15-1795-
232510 (discussing the Federalist-dominated Senate’s rejection of President Washington’s nomination of John 
Rutledge for the position of Chief Justice, motivated in large part by Rutledge’s opposition to the Jay Treaty). 
 5. Mel Leonor, Ginsburg Calls for Return of “Bipartisan Spirit” to Judicial Confirmations, POLITICO 
(May 21, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/05/21/ruth-bader-ginsburg-bipartisan-judicial-
confirmations-601835. 
 6. Stephen Breyer was confirmed in 1997 by a vote of eighty-seven to nine. See Supreme Court 
Nominations (Present–1789), U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/legislative/nominations/SupremeCourt 
Nominations1789present.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2020). John Roberts was confirmed in 2005 by a vote of 
seventy-eight to twenty-two. Id. Harriet Miers did not receive a vote. Id. Samuel Alito was confirmed in 2006 
by a vote of fifty-eight to forty-two. Id. Sonia Sotomayor was confirmed in 2009 by a vote of sixty-eight to 
thirty-one. Id. Elena Kagan was confirmed in 2010 by a vote of sixty-three to thirty-seven. Merrick Garland did 
not receive a vote. Id. Neil Gorsuch was confirmed in 2017 by a vote of fifty-four to forty-five. Id. Brett 
Kavanaugh was confirmed in 2018 by a vote of fifty to forty-eight. Id. 
 7. See generally Jessica Yarvin & Daniel Bush, Is the Hyper-Partisan Supreme Court Confirmation 
Process “The New Normal?,” PBS NEWSHOUR (Sept. 13, 2018, 4:51 PM), https://www.pbs.org/ 
newshour/nation/is-the-hyper-partisan-supreme-court-confirmation-process-the-new-normal. 
 8. Michael D. Shear et al., Obama Chooses Merrick Garland for Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/17/us/politics/obama-supreme-court-nominee.html. 
 9. KAROL CORBIN WALKER, CHAIR, ABA STANDING COMM. ON THE FED. JUDICIARY, STATEMENT OF 
WALKER CONCERNING THE NOMINATION OF THE HONORABLE MERRICK B. GARLAND TO BE ASSOCIATE JUSTICE 
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (2016), https://www.americanbar.org/ 
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Leader Mitch McConnell announced that the Senate would not hold 
confirmation hearings for Garland, his explanation was strictly political.10 
McConnell never raised objections to Garland’s qualifications, temperament, or 
judicial philosophy; instead, he expressed a preference for “let[ting] the 
American people decide,” as opposed to a “lame duck President.”11 In other 
words, McConnell explicitly rejected the notion that the confirmation process is 
beyond the scope of partisan politics. Garland never received a hearing or vote, 
and his nomination expired at the end of President Obama’s second term.12  
When President Donald Trump nominated Neil Gorsuch to the same seat, 
virtually all parties acknowledged that Gorsuch, like Garland, was eminently 
qualified for the position.13 However, Senate Democrats, embittered by the 
Republicans’ treatment of Garland, voted overwhelmingly against the nominee, 
and the final vote to confirm Gorsuch (fifty-four to forty-five) fell largely along 
party lines.14  
Finally, when President Trump nominated Brett Kavanaugh to the Court to 
replace Justice Anthony Kennedy who had retired, the confirmation process was 
partisan from the outset, both with respect to Kavanaugh’s jurisprudence and to 
the availability of certain documents from Kavanagh’s tenure in the Bush 
Administration.15 However, the process became more political still after 
Christine Blasey Ford came forward with an allegation that Kavanaugh had 
sexually assaulted her in high school.16 After hearing testimony from Ford and 
Kavanaugh and opening a second background check on the allegations,17 the 
 
content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/2016jun21_garlandstatement.authcheckdam.pdf (rating Merrick Garland 
“Well Qualified” to serve on the Supreme Court).  
 10. Amita Kelly, McConnell: Blocking Supreme Court Nomination “About a Principle, Not a Person,” 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 16, 2016, 12:31 PM), https://www.npr.org/2016/03/16/470664561/mcconnell-
blocking-supreme-court-nomination-about-a-principle-not-a-person.  
 11. Id.  
 12. See Amy Howe, Garland Nomination Officially Expires, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 3, 2017, 6:47 PM), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2017/01/garland-nomination-officially-expires.  
 13. NANCY SCOTT DEGAN, CHAIR, ABA STANDING COMM. ON THE FED. JUDICIARY, STATEMENT OF 
DEGAN CONCERNING THE NOMINATION OF THE HONORABLE NEIL GORSUCH TO BE ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
uncategorized/GAO/Gorsuch%20Statement%20submitted%203%2019%202017F.authcheckdam.pdf (rating 
Neil Gorsuch “Well Qualified” to serve on the Supreme Court).  
 14. Roll Call Vote 115th Congress—1st Session, SENATE.GOV, https://www.senate.gov/legislative/ 
LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=115&session=1&vote=00111 (last visited Apr. 15, 2020) 
(showing a summary of the nomination vote for Justice Neil M. Gorsuch).  
 15. See Michael D. Shear et al., Kavanaugh Ducks Questions on Presidential Powers and Subpoenas, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/05/us/politics/brett-kavanaugh-hearing.html; see also 
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, White House Withholds 100,000 Pages of Judge Brett Kavanaugh’s Records, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/01/us/politics/kavanaugh-records.html.  
 16. See Robert Barnes et al., Acrimony, Resolve After Kavanaugh and Ford Testify with Nomination 
Hanging in the Balance, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.adn.com/nation-
world/2018/09/28/acrimony-resolve-after-kavanaugh-and-ford-testimony-as-nomination-hangs-in-balance 
(“The warring accounts from Kavanaugh and his accuser . . . gripped the country and intensified what will be 
one of the most fraught confirmation votes in history.”). 
 17. See Noor Wazwaz et al., Trump Orders Limited FBI Investigation to Supplement Kavanaugh 
Background Check, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 28, 2018, 7:55 AM), 
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Senate ultimately voted to confirm Kavanaugh, this time by an almost entirely 
party-line vote of fifty to forty-eight.18 The process energized both Republicans 
and Democrats, and pundits and analysts quickly began to speculate as to how 
the “Kavanaugh effect” would impact voter turnout in the upcoming midterm 
elections.19 In each of these instances, the Supreme Court confirmation process 
has functioned as a political battleground between left and right, and in the 
current political climate, this seems unlikely to change, absent some procedural 
reform.  
There is no shortage of explanations as to how we arrived here. Democrats 
sometimes cast blame on the Republicans’ treatment of Merrick Garland in 
2016.20 Republicans point instead to the Democrats’ treatment of Robert Bork 
in 1987.21 This Note takes no opinion as to how the confirmation process became 
so polarized. Instead, it begins with the assumption that political polarization has 
fundamentally changed how the confirmation process works and that this change 
has been for the worse. This is not to say that the Senate should confirm every 
candidate that the president nominates, or that the nominee’s ideology is not a 
relevant factor in the Senate’s evaluation. To the contrary, the Senate’s role of 
providing advice and consent is an important check on the president, and it 
would be highly undesirable for a president concerned only with judicial 
outcomes to have free reign in appointing like-minded justices.  
However, confirmation hearings need not be strictly political battles, and 
because the Court is primarily concerned with the daunting task of interpreting 
federal law and the Constitution,22 the nominee’s qualifications and character 
 
https://www.npr.org/2018/09/28/652486413/judiciary-committee-set-to-vote-on-kavanaugh-friday-with-eyes-
on-undecided-jeff. 
 18. Roll Call Vote 115th Congress—2nd Session, SENATE.GOV, https://www.senate.gov/legislative/ 
LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=115&session=2&vote=00223#top (last visited Apr. 15, 
2020) (showing a summary of the nomination vote for Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh).  
 19. Compare John Bowden, Priebus: Republican Voters Energized by “Kavanaugh Effect,” HILL (Oct. 
14, 2018, 7:01 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/sunday-talk-shows/411282-priebus-republican-voters-
energized-by-kavanaugh-effect (“Former White House chief of staff Reince Preibus said Sunday that Brett 
Kavanaugh’s successful nomination to the Supreme Court . . . energized Republican-leaning voters and will 
boost turnout in next month’s midterm elections.”), with Megan Keller, Poll: “Kavanaugh Effect” Spurs More 
to Vote Democrat than Republican, HILL (Oct. 24, 2018, 10:32 AM), 
https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/412905-poll-kavanaugh-effect-spurs-slightly-more-people-to-
vote-democrat (“The brutal battle over Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s confirmation has spurred more 
people to vote Democrat than Republican, according to a new poll.”). 
 20. See Jonathan Capehart, McConnell, not Obama, Is Politicizing the Supreme Court, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 
17, 2016), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-mitch-mcconnell-obama-supreme-
court-merrick-garland-20160317-story.html (arguing that Senate Republicans were wrongfully politicizing 
Garland’s nomination). 
 21. See Kevin D. Williamson, Your Rules, Democrats, NAT’L REV. (Feb. 15, 2016, 3:35 PM), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/democrats-showed-us-how-and-why-block-supreme-court-nominees/ 
(arguing that the Senate’s rejection of Robert Bork’s nomination constituted “the arrival of Supreme Court 
confirmation hearings as bare-knuckle political brawls.”).  
 22. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising 
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their 
Authority.”). 
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ought to be emphasized in the Senate’s evaluation. Unfortunately, the country’s 
divisive political climate renders it unlikely that the Senate will organically 
change its approach to evaluating nominees. On the political right, for example, 
Senate Republicans refused to give Judge Garland a hearing, despite his 
reputation for being a judicial moderate and his “penchant for judicial restraint,” 
a trait often associated with conservative jurists.23 Their opposition, of course, 
had little to do with Garland and everything to do with the fact that it was 
President Obama who had nominated him.24 On the political left, Democratic 
strategists “vowed a fierce battle” against President Trump’s replacement for 
Justice Kennedy just days after Kennedy announced his retirement,25 with at 
least one Senate Democrat announcing her opposition to the nominee “twelve 
days before anyone knew” who the nominee would be.26 It is difficult to untangle 
these examples of hyper-partisan Supreme Court politics from the polling data: 
in 2018, seventy-six percent of voters deemed “Supreme Court appointments” a 
“very important” issue, which was more than any other issue.27 For context, the 
issue most deemed “very important” to voters has been “the economy” in every 
year since 2004.28 Furthermore, the partisan gap in how Americans view the 
Supreme Court is “among the widest in two decades.”29 In short, recent history 
indicates that our Supreme Court politics have become increasingly polarized. 
A change in the structure of the confirmation process may be necessary in order 
to fix this problem. More to the point, drawing on the experiences of other 
countries that have successfully implemented limited tenure, this Note 
 
 23. Timothy Noah & Brian Mahoney, How Liberal Is Merrick Garland?, POLITICO (Mar. 16, 2016, 7:52 
PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/03/supreme-court-merrick-garland-220904. 
 24. Ron Elving, What Happened with Merrick Garland in 2016 and Why It Matters Now, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (June 29, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/29/624467256/what-happened-with-merrick-
garland-in-2016-and-why-it-matters-now?utm_source=facebook.com&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign= 
npr&utm_term=nprnews&utm_content=20180629&fbclid=IwAR1313vggSduDaHbxS7H6gSeDdjrGlOF68Zu
5VMXggp2RImrXiaDgiOf61k (explaining that after Justice Scalia died in 2016, Senate Majority Leader Mitch 
McConnell “looked Barack Obama in the eye and . . . said, ‘Mr. President, you will not fill the Supreme Court 
vacancy.’”). 
 25. Michael D. Shear & Thomas Kaplan, Political War Over Replacing Kennedy on Supreme Court Is 
Underway, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/us/politics/trump-supreme-
court-kennedy.html. 
 26. See Thomas Jipping, The Truth About Democrats’ Opposition to Brett Kavanaugh, NAT’L REV. (Sept. 
12, 2018, 5:44 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/brett-kavanaugh-supreme-court-
nomination-democrat-opposition. 
 27. Voter Enthusiasm at Record High in Nationalized Midterm Environment, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 26, 
2018), https://www.people-press.org/2018/09/26/voter-enthusiasm-at-record-high-in-nationalized-midterm-
environment. 
 28. Grace Sparks, Supreme Court Is Voters’ Most “Very Important” Issue, CNN, 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/26/politics/important-issue-vote-pew-supreme-court/index.html (last updated 
Sept. 26, 2018, 6:11 PM). 
 29. Bruce Drake & John Gramlich, 5 Facts About the Supreme Court, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 7, 2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/10/07/5-facts-about-the-supreme-court/ (explaining that seventy-
five percent of Republicans view the Supreme Court favorably, but only forty-nine percent of Democrats view 
the Court favorably). 
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ultimately advocates the adoption of a Twenty-Eighth Amendment, limiting 
tenure for Supreme Court justices to eighteen-year terms.  
Part I provides a brief overview of the Framers’ reasons for choosing “good 
behavior” tenure for Article III judges, including Supreme Court justices. Part II 
situates the United States as one of the only countries in the modern world that 
gives life tenure to the judges on its court of last resort, emphasizing the unique 
risks inherent in life tenure for judges who pass on constitutional questions. 
Then, having established the prospective benefits of a reduction in Supreme 
Court tenure and the comparative rarity of life tenure, Part III examines what 
tenure limits look like in practice. First, it examines mandatory retirement age 
as a method for limiting tenure. Brazil will be the primary case study, given that 
its judicial selection process is almost perfectly analogous to that of the United 
States, although it will also examine Australia to illustrate the extent to which 
mandatory retirement age can yield shorter terms for judges. Next, Part III will 
examine the “term of years” approach as a second method for reducing judicial 
tenure. The case study here will be Mexico, which exemplifies a moderately 
successful implementation of “term of years” tenure limits, but also highlights 
how tenure limits can facilitate arbitrary disparities in Presidential appointment 
power. This disparity, I shall argue, can be mitigated with staggered, 18-year 
judicial terms. 
I.  A STRONG AND INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY: THE ORIGINAL PURPOSE OF LIFE 
TENURE 
The current practice for federal judicial tenure in the United States is rooted 
in Article III of the Constitution, which provides that “judges, both of the 
supreme court and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good 
behavior.”30 Absent impeachment, this affords life tenure to all federal judges.31  
A. “GOOD BEHAVIOR” TENURE AS A RESPONSE TO BRITAIN’S “AT WILL” 
TENURE 
Article III’s “good behavior” approach arose as a reaction to a series of 
changes in the British judicial appointment process, wherein judges served not 
during “good behavior” but rather “at [the] pleasure” of the Crown.32 
Historically, the British had used “good behavior” tenure for judges, and when 
King George III shifted from a “good behavior” system to an “at pleasure” 
system, the American colonists expressed their dissatisfaction with that change 
in the Declaration of Independence. One of the grievances listed in the 
Declaration was that King George III had made “[j]udges dependent on his Will 
alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their 
 
 30. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 31. Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins (and Fragility) of Judicial Independence, 71 VAND. L. REV. 465, 540 
(2018). 
 32. John V. Orth, Who Judges the Judges?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1245, 1249 (2005).   
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salaries.”33 To protect the judiciary against this sort of undue influence by the 
executive branch, the Framers reinstituted “good behavior” tenure protection for 
Article III judges.34 This way, judges would be relatively insulated from political 
pressures, but Congress could still remove judges for cause in cases of egregious 
misconduct through the impeachment process.35 The Framers’ system makes 
sense as a response to George III’s encroachments upon the British judiciary, 
and while the political branches are often critical of the Supreme Court’s 
decisions, their general deference to the authority of Article III is evidence that 
the Framers were successful in creating what they had intended: a politically 
independent judiciary. However, by adopting “good behavior” tenure protection 
as the means of securing a politically independent judiciary, the Framers also 
vested the individual members of the judiciary with immense power to interpret 
the laws and Constitution of the United States. 
B. LONGER TERMS: AVERAGE TENURE FROM THE FRAMERS TO TODAY 
The antifederalist Brutus, concerned by this immense power concentrated 
in federal judges, argued that “[unchecked] power in the judicial, will enable 
[judges] to mould the government, into almost any shape they please.”36 This 
certainly played a role in the antifederalists’ opposition to life tenure for federal 
judges.37 The federalist response to this sort of argument is summed up well by 
Alexander Hamilton, writing as Publius in Federalist 78: a “temporary duration 
in office,” as opposed to the “good behavior” model enshrined in Article III, 
would “naturally discourage” those with “sufficient skill in the laws to qualify 
them for the stations of judges” from “quitting a lucrative line of practice to 
accept a seat on the bench.”38 This is a strong argument, and if one could only 
select between “good behavior” tenure and the tenure limits that govern the 
political branches,39 the “good behavior” tenure model seems to be the better 
option. Brutus’s argument was further weakened because Justices did not serve 
particularly long terms at the beginning of the Republic: average tenure on the 
Supreme Court from 1789 to 1820 was only seven and a half years.40 Because 
average tenure was so short, many of the early justices had less of an opportunity 
to “mould the government” as they wished. This is not to say that many of the 
Federalist Justices’ early decisions were not highly distressing to Jeffersonian 
 
 33. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 9 (U.S. 1776). 
 34. Orth, supra note 32, at 1249. 
 35. See Harry T. Edwards, Regulating Judicial Misconduct and Divining “Good Behavior” for Federal 
Judges, 87 MICH. L. REV. 765, 776–78 (1989). 
 36. BRUTUS, BRUTUS XI (1788). 
 37. See Showcase Panel II: Judicial Tenure: Life Tenure or Fixed Non-Renewable Terms?, 12 BARRY L. 
REV. 173, 191 (2009) (“Antifederalists . . . were opposed to life tenure in the first place.”). 
 38. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 39. Two, four, or six years, depending on the office. 
 40. Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered, 
29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 769, 778 (2006). 
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Republicans.41 However, with a relatively high rate of turnover in the federal 
judiciary, subsequent presidents and senates had more opportunities to nominate 
and confirm judges, thereby limiting the relative power and influence of any one 
judge.42  
Today, however, things are significantly different. The average tenure of 
Supreme Court justices retiring between 1971 and 2006 was 26.1 years.43 This 
drastic increase in length of tenure, due in large part to improved life 
expectancy,44 increases the power vested in any one judge, especially at the 
Supreme Court level. Brutus’s concern seems far more plausible if justices have 
not just years, but decades to “mould the government.” In fact, contemporary 
commentators relay his same concerns when they discuss President Trump’s 
“reshaping [of] the federal judiciary.”45 It is a small wonder, then, that the 
confirmation process has become more partisan. If a judicial nominee, especially 
for the Supreme Court, is slated to stay on the bench for over two decades, it is 
not surprising that members of the political branches should be primarily 
concerned with how that nominee might rule in cases that directly affect the 
major political and social issues of the day. 
Given the choice between the shortened terms characteristic of the average 
justice in the early Republic and the even shorter terms served by members of 
congress or the president, Hamilton’s argument wins out over that of Brutus. 
However, given the decades-long tenures that are characteristic of today’s 
justices, the case for a middle ground seems stronger still. As Justice Kagan has 
cautiously suggested, a constitutional amendment providing for a modest 
reduction in judicial tenure may “take some of the high stakes out of the 
confirmation process.”46 At the same time, a limit on tenure that cuts too short 
may result in a sort of revolving door between the Supreme Court and private 
actors, which could be damaging to the Court’s legitimacy as an institution. 
While the Court’s current approval rating of fifty-four percent is not historically 
 
 41. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson, former President of the United States, to Spencer Roane, 
Judge, Va. Court of Appeals (Mar. 9, 1821), http://tjrs.monticello.org/letter/1557 (“The great object of my fear 
is the federal judiciary.”). 
 42. Abhinav Chandrachud, Does Life Tenure Make Judges More Independent? A Comparative Study of 
Judicial Appointments in India, 28 CONN. J. INT’L L. 297, 302 (2013) (“[S]hortening the tenure of a constitutional 
court judge reduces the amount of time he has to be able to make a difference—making judicial actors less 
threatening to political powers.”). 
 43. Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 40, at 778. 
 44. See Daniel J. Meador, Restructuring the Supreme Court: Regularizing Appointments, Providing More 
Frequent Rotation, Avoiding Physical and Mental Impairment, 25 J.L. & POL. 459, 461 (2009) (“Life expectancy 
is now 78 years (up from 47 in the founding generation), and predicted to increase three months every year.”). 
 45. See Carrie Johnson, One Year in, Trump Has Kept a Major Campaign Promise: Reshaping the Federal 
Judiciary, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 21, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/01/21/ 
579169772/one-year-in-trump-has-kept-a-major-promise-reshaping-the-federal-judiciary. 
 46. Justice Kagan on SCOTUS Term Limits: “Maybe,” C-SPAN (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.c-
span.org/video/?c4757264/justice-kagan-scotus-term-limits-maybe. 
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high,47 it is significantly higher than current presidential,48 as well as 
congressional,49 approval ratings. It is important that the public continue to view 
the Court as “a disinterested arbiter of the law,” rather than “a partisan 
institution,”50 and a system in which justices serve short terms and then leave 
the Court to either run for political office or take well-compensated positions in 
the private sector may well have an adverse effect on the Court’s legitimacy. 
Therefore, a successful amendment would strike the correct balance between 
“high stakes” life tenure and, as Justice Stephen Breyer put it, “a term that is so 
short that the person sitting there is thinking about his next job.”51 America need 
not look far for inspiration; virtually every other country with a mature judiciary 
system has adopted some form of restraint on judicial tenure. 
II.  THE COMPARATIVE RARITY OF LIFE TENURE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 
Critics of life tenure tend to emphasize the extent to which it is a uniquely 
American phenomenon. While it is not true, as some have asserted, that “[n]o 
other democracy gives life tenure to judges on its version of the Supreme 
Court,”52 it is helpful to understand the United States’ practice in relation to other 
judicial systems’ in order to appreciate its rarity. 
First, one must clarify what constitutes a country’s “version of the Supreme 
Court.” The Supreme Court of the United States is relatively consolidated in that 
it has final say in appeals for all questions regarding the Constitution and federal 
law.53 This is not unique, but it is worth noting that many other countries erect 
constitutional courts separate from courts of general jurisdiction. For instance, 
the Comoros divides judicial power between its Supreme Court54 and its 
Constitutional Court.55 While judges of either court are technically “irremovable 
from office,”56 Constitutional Court judges are limited in tenure to six-year 
 
 47. Supreme Court, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/4732/supreme-court.aspx (last visited Apr. 15, 
2020 
 48. At the time of writing, President Trump’s approval rating is averaged at 44.4%. See How Popular is 
Donald Trump, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT, https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/trump-approval-
ratings/?ex_cid=rrpromo (last updated Apr. 15, 2020, 10:06 AM).  
 49. At the time of writing, Congress’s approval rating is twenty-two percent. See Congress and the Public, 
GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1600/congress-public.aspx (last visited Apr. 15, 2020). 
 50. Anthony J. Gaughan, The Case for Limiting Federal Criminal Jurisdiction over State and Local 
Campaign Contributions, 65 ARK. L. REV. 587, 626 (2012). 
 51. Honorable Stephen Breyer, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Conversation at Association of American 
Law Schools Annual Meeting (Mar. 28, 2016) [hereinafter Breyer Conversation], 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SjqKy8WOkP0&feature=youtu.be&t=3045. 
 52. Matthew Yglesias, No Other Democracy Gives Life Tenure to Judges on Its Version of the Supreme 
Court, VOX (Feb. 16, 2016, 4:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/2016/2/16/11024096/life-tenure-judges. 
 53. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 54. COMOROS CONSTITUTION, MAY 23, 2009, tit. 3, ch. 3, art. 29. 
 55. Id. tit. 6, art. 36. 
 56. Id. tit. 3, ch. 3, art. 28. 
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terms,57 whereas Supreme Court judges are not subject to any restrictions on 
tenure.58  
A. THE PREVALENCE OF TENURE LIMITS FOR NON-CONSTITUTIONAL HIGH 
COURTS 
At present, there are at least seven countries, including other well-
established democracies like Italy and France, that have adopted systems similar 
to that of the Comoros, in which supreme court judges have life tenure and 
constitutional court judges have limited tenure.59 In these countries, the rationale 
for limiting judicial tenure for constitutional courts but not for non-constitutional 
supreme courts is straightforward: in a democracy, a legislature can pass a 
statute if it objects to the outcome of a particular supreme court decision, but 
constitutional courts often have, “effectively, the last word in conflicts with 
[legislatures].”60 Therefore, the prospect of putting a bad judge on a 
constitutional court is more troublesome than a similarly situated nominee for a 
supreme court, since the legislature may be powerless to remedy a bad decision. 
 
 57. Id. tit. 6, art. 38. 
 58. Id. tit. 3, ch. 3, art. 29. 
 59. Compare LA CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU TCHAD PROMULGUEE LE 04 MAI 2018 
[CONSTITUTION] May 4, 2018, tit. 6, ch 1, art. 160 (Chad), translated in CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
CHAD 27 (Maria del Carmen Gress &J.J. Ruchti trans., Library 2018) (“The members of the Supreme Court are 
designated for a mandate of seven (7) years removable.”), with id., tit. 5, ch. 1, art. 154, translated in 
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHAD, supra, at 28 (“The members of the Supreme Court are irremovable 
during their mandate.”); compare Ústavní zákon č. 1/1993 Sb., Ústava České Republiky [Constitution of the 
Czech Republic], ch. 6, art. 84, translated in Czech Republic 1993 (rev. 2013), CONSTITUTE, 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Czech_Republic_2013?lang=en (last visited Apr. 15, 2020) 
(“The Constitutional Court shall be composed of fifteen Justices appointed for a period of ten years.”), with id., 
ch. 4, art. 93, translated in Czech Republic 1993 (rev. 2013), supra (“[Supreme Court] Judges are appointed to 
their office for an unlimited term by the President of the Republic.”); compare 1958 CONST., tit. 7, art. 56 (Fr.), 
translated in France 1958 (rev. 2008), CONSTITUTE, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/ 
France_2008?lang=en (last visited Apr. 15, 2020) (“The Constitutional Council shall comprise nine members, 
each of whom shall hold office for a non-renewable term of nine years.”), with id., tit. 8, art. 64, translated in 
France 1958 (rev. 2008), supra (“Judges shall be irremovable from office.”); compare COSTITUZIONE [COST.], 
tit. 6, § 1, art. 135 (It.), translated in Italy 1947 (rev. 2012), CONSTITUTE, https://www.constituteproject.org/ 
constitution/Italy_2012?lang=en (last visited Apr. 15, 2020) (“Judges of the Constitutional Court shall be 
appointed for nine years . . . and they may not be re-appointed.”), with id., tit. 4, § 1, art. 107, translated in Italy 
1947 (rev. 2012), supra (“Judges may not be removed from office.”); compare CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA 
PORTUGUESA [CONSTITUTION] (1976), tit. 6, art. 222 (Port.), translated in Portugal 1976 (rev. 2005), 
CONSTITUTE, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Portugal_2005?lang=en (last visited Apr. 15, 2020) 
(“The term of office of judge of the Constitutional Court shall be nine years.”), with id. tit. 5, ch. 3, art. 216, 
translated in Portugal 1976 (rev. 2005), supra (“[Supreme Court] Judges shall enjoy security of tenure and shall 
not be transferred, suspended, retired or removed from office except in the cases laid down by law.”); compare 
URADNI REPUBLIKE SLOVENIJE [CONSTITUTION] Feb. 27, 2003, ch. 8, art. 165 (Slovn.), translated in Slovenia 
1991 (rev. 2016), CONSTITUTE, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Slovenia_2016?lang=en (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2020) (“Constitutional Court judges are elected for a term of nine years. Constitutional Court 
judges may not be re-elected.”), with id., ch. 4, art. 129, translated in Slovenia 1991 (rev. 2016), supra (“The 
office of a [Supreme Court] judge is permanent.”). 
 60. Lech Garlicki, Constitutional Courts Versus Supreme Courts, 5 INT’L J. CONST. L. 44, 61 (2007). 
COSTELLO-71.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/20  3:45 PM 
1164 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:1153 
Accordingly, the system limits tenure for constitutional court judges as a means 
of mitigating this risk.  
When comparing the tenure of United States Supreme Court justices to 
judges on other courts of last resort, other commentators have generally chosen 
to emphasize the practices of courts “designed to pass on the constitutionality of 
government actions” over those of non-constitutional supreme courts.61 This is 
understandable, given the importance and relative finality of constitutional 
decisions, as contrasted with the relative ease by which erroneous non-
constitutional decisions can be fixed by legislatures.62 This Note does not 
challenge the use of constitutional courts in comparative analysis. Of course, 
because the American judiciary is not structured along the same bifurcated lines 
as the Comoros, a bifurcated approach to judicial tenure is not possible. 
However, because the Supreme Court’s authority extends far beyond its 
interpretation of solely Constitutional matters, it is worth mentioning that several 
countries have adopted life tenure for high courts that pass on more general 
issues.63  
B. THE (EVEN GREATER) PREVALENCE OF TENURE LIMITS FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL HIGH COURTS 
While the United States is not entirely alone in its practice of giving life 
tenure to judges who have final say on constitutional questions, it is in rather 
sparse company. At present, there are only four other countries that extend life 
tenure to such judges.64 Additionally, as one learns by looking more closely, the 
constitutional promise of life tenure does not necessarily guarantee to other 
judiciaries the same level of judicial independence that one might associate with 
the American system.  
In practice, only two of the four judiciaries that afford life tenures have 
practices analogous to that of the United States: Estonia and Luxembourg. The 
Estonian judiciary has three levels of courts (county, circuit, and Supreme), and 
all are governed by Chapter XIII of the Estonian Constitution.65 Chapter XIII, 
Section 147 explicitly provides that “[j]udges are appointed for life” and “may 
be removed from office only by a court judgment.”66  
Luxembourg’s system is slightly different. Whereas Estonia, like the 
United States, has but one court of last resort, Luxembourg, like Italy and 
France, maintains a Constitutional Court distinct from its Superior Court of 
 
 61. See, e.g., Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 40, at 819 n.138. 
 62. See Garlicki, supra note 60, at 66. 
 63. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 64. See Judge Selection and Term of Office: Countries Compared, NATIONMASTER, 
https://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/Government/Judicial-branch/Judge-selection-and-term-of-
office (last visited Apr. 15, 2020). 
 65. EESTI VABARIIGI PÕHISEADUS [CONSTITUTION] June 28, 1992, ch. 13, art 148 (Est.), translated in The 
Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, RIIGITEATAJA, https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/530102013003/ 
consolide (last visited Apr. 15, 2020). 
 66. Id. ch. 13, art. 147. 
COSTELLO-71.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/20  3:45 PM 
May 2020] SUPREME COURT POLITICS 1165 
Justice.67 Unlike Italy and France, however, Luxembourg’s Constitution 
explicitly provides that judges on either court are “irremovable” and “may only 
be deprived of [their posts] or suspended . . . by a judgment.”68 Therefore, 
Luxembourg takes on greater risk than its counterparts in extending the same 
tenure to its Constitutional Court as it does to its Superior Court of Justice. It is 
also worth noting that both Estonia and Luxembourg are member states of the 
European Union and are thereby subject to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), 
much as the several states are subject to judicial review by the United States 
Supreme Court, and that the judges of the ECJ do not enjoy life tenure.69 
However, for all national matters that fall outside the ECJ’s jurisdiction, both 
countries have chosen to employ the American model of life tenure for judges. 
The third country with life tenure is Oman. Its Basic Law, which functions 
as the sultanate’s constitution, provides that judges “shall be irremovable except 
in circumstances specified by the [Basic] Law.”70 However, as referenced in 
Article 41, Oman is an absolute monarchy, rather than a democracy, and the 
Sultan “is the head of State and the Supreme Commander of the Forces, his 
person is inviolable, respect of him is a duty, and his command is obeyed.”71 
Predictably, ultimate power over legal and constitutional matters lies with the 
Sultan under such a system: Article 71 provides explicitly that all “[j]udgments 
shall be rendered and enforced in the name of His Majesty the Sultan.”72 
Practically, this has meant that while the courts retain nominal control over the 
administration of the law, the Sultan can overturn judicial decisions if he so 
chooses.73 This concentration of power in the executive is fundamentally at odds 
with the American model of judicial independence, so while Oman may have 
technically adopted life tenure for judges in its Basic Law, it cannot be said that 
its judiciary is analogous to that of the United States. 
The fourth country is Haiti, although it remains unclear whether Haitian 
judges actually enjoy life tenure. The Haitian Constitution is inconsistent on the 
matter. Article 174 of the Haitian Constitution provides: “Judges of the Supreme 
 
 67. CONSTITUTION, Oct. 17, 1868, ch. 6, art. 87, 95 (Lux.), translated in Luxembourg 1868 (rev. 2009), 
CONSTITUTE, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Luxembourg_2009?lang=en (last visited Apr. 15, 
2020).  
 68. Id. ch. 6, art. 91. 
 69. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 253, Oct. 26. 2012. 
2012 O.J. (C 326) 47, 158 (“The Judges . . . of the Court of Justice . . . shall be appointed by common accord of 
the governments of the Member States for a term of six years.”).  
 70. BASIC LAW OF THE SULTANATE OF OMAN [CONSTITUTION] NOV. 6, 1996, ch. 6, art. 61, translated in 
Royal Decree No. (101/96): Promulgating the Basic Statute by the State, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., 
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/om/om019en.pdf. 
 71. Id. ch. 4, art. 41.  
 72. Id. ch. 6, art. 71. 
 73. See Oman, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (2011), https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/nea/ 
154470.htm (“The law provides for an independent judiciary; however, the sultan may act as a court of final 
appeal and exercise his power of pardon as chairman of the Supreme Judicial Council.”). 
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Court and Courts of Appeal are appointed for ten (10) years.”74 This seems to 
be an unambiguous rejection of the American model of life tenure for judges. It 
is odd, then, that Article 177 provides instead: “Judges of the Supreme Court, 
the Courts of Appeal and the Courts of First Instance are appointed for life. They 
may be removed from office only because of a legally determined abuse of 
authority.”75 The two articles are obviously in contradiction, and it is unclear 
from the structure of the document which article should control. To make 
matters more confusing, in 2005, Boniface Alexandre, an interim president, 
mandated the early retirement of five Supreme Court judges before any had 
completed ten years of service.76 Therefore, even if the Haitian Constitution was 
found to guarantee life tenure in Article 177, Haiti’s practice does not seem 
analogous to that of the American judicial system. 
Notwithstanding these four exceptions, every country in the world has 
rejected the American model of life tenure for judges.77 Given the overwhelming 
number of countries, one should consider whether the problems currently 
associated with the American confirmation process could be mitigated by 
reducing judicial tenure. 
III.  TWO APPROACHES TO LIMITS ON JUDICIAL TENURE 
Fundamentally, there are two approaches to limiting life tenure for 
justices.78 Either one would have to be implemented by a Twenty-Eighth 
Amendment, rather than by statute, since Article III specifically provides for 
“good behavior” tenure.79 The first proposal is a mandatory retirement age.80 
The second involves limiting each justice’s tenure to one eighteen-year, 
nonrenewable term. While there is a broad range of possible tenures, Justice 
Kagan has called eighteen years “the going proposal,”81 and there is at least one 
 
 74. 1987 CONSTITUTION DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE D’HAÏTI, ch. 4, art. 174 (Haiti), translated Haiti 1987 (rev. 
2012), CONSTITUTE, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Haiti_2012?lang=en (last visited Apr. 15, 
2020).  
 75. Id. ch. 4, art. 177 
 76. INTER-AM. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, HAITI: FAILED 
JUSTICE OR THE RULE OF LAW? CHALLENGES AHEAD FOR HAITI AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 15 
(2006), http://cidh.org/countryrep/HAITI%20ENGLISH7X10%20FINAL.pdf. 
 77. See Judge Selection and Term of Office: Countries Compared, supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 78. This Note does not consider more democratic approaches to limiting judicial tenure, such as elections. 
It does so with the assumption that the American system values judicial independence, which is limited by 
subjecting judges to elections. For a discussion on the antagonistic relationship between judicial independence 
and judicial elections, see Shira J. Goodman et al., What’s More Important: Electing Judges or Judicial 
Independence? It’s Time for Pennsylvania to Choose Judicial Independence, 48 DUQ. L. REV. 859, 860 (2010). 
 79. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 80. See Gabe Roth, Where John Ashcroft and Merrick Garland Meet, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (June 10, 
2016), https://fixthecourt.com/2016/06/ftc-op-ed-on-a-mandatory-retirement-age-for-supreme-court-justices/ 
(advocating a mandatory retirement age of seventy for Supreme Court justices); see also Joel Cohen, Richard 
A. Posner, and Jed S. Rakoff, Should There Be Age Limits for Federal Judges, SLATE (July 5, 2017, 5:11 PM), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/07/should-there-be-age-limits-for-federal-judges.html (considering a 
mandatory retirement age of eighty for federal judges). 
 81. See Justice Kagan on SCOTUS Term Limits: “Maybe,” supra note 46. 
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proposal for an eighteen-year term limit that appears to have garnered some 
traction.82 Furthermore, 18 years seems long enough to prevent the revolving 
door concern to which Justice Breyer alluded.83 This Note considers the two 
approaches in turn. 
A. MANDATORY RETIREMENT AGE IN OTHER COMMON LAW COUNTRIES 
At first glance, the mandatory retirement age approach makes particular 
sense for the United States, given its common law heritage and the fact that the 
United States adopted life tenure in large part because the English adopted such 
a practice after the Glorious Revolution of 1688.84 That the British have since 
adopted a mandatory retirement age, as have many other common law 
countries,85 suggests that a mandatory retirement age might be a good fit for the 
American system.  
1. Mandatory Retirement Age and Reduced Average Tenure in 
Parliamentary Democracies 
The argument in favor of mandatory retirement age reads like this: If we 
know that a justice must retire at a given age, then there is a fixed upper limit on 
that justice’s term.86 In theory, this will result in shorter terms for judges, and at 
least amongst some parliamentary countries, there is some empirical evidence 
that bears this out.  
For instance, Australia, another common law country, has a mandatory 
retirement age of seventy.87 In 2015, the average length of service for an 
Australian High Court justice was about sixteen years,88 and given the High 
Court’s current composition, the average tenure is expected to fall below twelve 
years.89 The United States, having no mandatory retirement age and improving 
life expectancy, has seen judicial tenure increase rather than decrease: By 2006, 
the average length of tenure for Supreme Court justices had extended to over 
twenty-six years.90 With Justice Kennedy’s recent departure from the Court 
 
 82. See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 40, at 824.  
 83. See Breyer Conversation, supra note 51. 
 84. Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 40, at 777. 
 85. Id. at 819–20. 
 86. Layne S. Keele, Why the Judicial Elections Debate Matters Less Than You Think: Retention as the 
Cornerstone of Independence and Accountability, 47 AKRON L. REV. 375, 422 (2014) (“Judges who take office 
a given number of years away from a mandatory retirement age have an effective, though not explicit, tenure 
limit.”). 
 87. Australian Constitution s 51, ch. 3, art. 72 (“The appointment of a Justice of the High Court shall be 
for a term expiring upon his attaining the age of seventy years, and a person shall not be appointed as a Justice 
of the High Court if he has attained that age.”). 
 88. Brian Opeskin, Models of Judicial Tenure: Reconsidering Life Limits, Age Limits and Term Limits for 
Judges, 35 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 627, 646 fig.3 (2015). 
 89. Alysia Blackham, Judges and Retirement Ages, 39 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 738, 772 (2016). 
 90. Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 40, at 778. 
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marking thirty years on the bench, a reduction in this trend of longer terms seems 
unlikely.91 
In addition to yielding shorter terms, Australia’s judicial selection process 
also tends to produce substantially less controversy than its American 
counterpart.92 Of course, this may have more to do with the broader structure of 
Australia’s judicial selection process than with the length of judicial tenure. 
Australia is governed under a parliamentary system. Officially, justices are 
nominated by the Governor-General.93 This is something of a fiction, however; 
in practice, the nominating power lies entirely with the government cabinet and, 
ultimately, the Prime Minister.94 The Attorney General, who recommends a 
nominee to the Governor-General, is technically required to consult with state 
and territorial attorneys general before appointing justices,95 but ultimately, 
unchecked authority lies with the government-in-power to fill any vacancies on 
the Court.96 This is a material difference from the American system, wherein the 
president’s nomination is only the beginning of the selection process.97 
Therefore, one cannot easily attribute the relative absence of polarization 
surrounding Australian High Court appointments to the mandatory retirement 
age. 
An additional difference bearing concern is that while the American 
process of judicial selection may be too polarized, there are significant benefits 
to providing a check on the presidential power of appointment. In the event that 
a nominee is underqualified or holds views radically outside the jurisprudential 
mainstream, it seems desirable to have that nominee vetted by the legislature. In 
Australia, the Prime Minister’s cabinet does not have this constraint; it can 
appoint anyone to the High Court without consulting the rest of Parliament.98 In 
the past, this has enabled Prime Ministers to handpick like-minded politicians 
for seats on the High Court.99 Consider the example of Sir John Latham. A 
highly successful politician who served as Leader of the Opposition and Deputy 
 
 91. See Why Supreme Court Justices Serve Such Long Terms, ECONOMIST (July 4, 2018), 
https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/07/04/why-supreme-court-justices-serve-such-long-
terms.  
 92. Kate Malleson & Peter H. Russell Appointing Judges in an Age of Judicial Power: Critical 
Perspectives From Around the World, 39 OTTAWA L. REV. 133, 138 (2007) (book review) (“If the United States 
represents one extreme of judicial appointments in terms of negotiation and openness, the other extreme is surely 
found in Australia.”). 
 93. High Court of Australia Act 1979 pt. 2 div. 1 s 6 (Cth). 
 94. George Williams, A Better Way to Choose Judges, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (July 14, 2009), 
https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/a-better-way-to-choose-judges-20090907-fe33.html. 
 95. See High Court of Australia Act 1979 pt. 2 div. 1 s 6 (Cth). 
 96. See Elizabeth Handsley & Andrew Lynch, Facing up to Diversity? Transparency and the Reform of 
Commonwealth Judicial Appointments 2008-13, 37 SYDNEY L. REV. 187, 192 (2015) (“Beyond those very 
minimal requirements, the manner of judicial appointment adopted by the Commonwealth Government at any 
point in time is unconstrained.”). 
 97. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 98. See Handsley & Lynch, supra 96. 
 99. See, e.g., Fiona Wheeler, Sir John Latham’s Extra-Judicial Advising, 35 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 651, 
651–53 (2011).  
COSTELLO-71.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/20  3:45 PM 
May 2020] SUPREME COURT POLITICS 1169 
Prime Minister in the Parliament,100 Latham was appointed Chief Justice of the 
High Court by Prime Minister Joseph Lyons, a political ally of the same party.101 
Throughout his tenure on the Court, he “clandestinely advised several 
conservative political figures . . . on a range of controversial matters.”102 More 
disturbingly, Latham is thought to have “secretly advised Prime Minister 
Menzies on alterations to the Constitution to overcome the effect of the Court’s 
ruling” in Australian Communist Party v. Commonwealth, a case in which 
Latham wrote the lone dissent.103 
Of course, American presidents have also nominated political allies to the 
Supreme Court as a means of changing the Court’s predisposition on a set of 
issues, but at least in those instances, the nominees were subject to a process of 
advice and consent before receiving their commissions.104 The United States and 
Australia are both common law countries, but even a brief comparison of the 
two judicial selection systems casts doubt as to whether it would be procedurally 
possible or desirable for the United States to adopt anything resembling the 
Australian system. Therefore, in order to more accurately predict the potential 
impact of a mandatory retirement age on the American process, it is necessary 
to find a system that bears a closer structural resemblance to the American 
system.  
2. Lula’s Court: Brazil’s Problems with Mandatory Retirement Age 
Brazil offers a system analogous to that of the United States.105 The 
American influence on the Brazilian Constitution is well documented.106 This is 
reflected in the process by which its Supreme Federal Court ministers are 
appointed: ministers are nominated by Brazil’s President and confirmed by 
Brazil’s Federal Senate.107 The ministers then serve until mandatory retirement 
at age seventy-five.108  
Despite these constitutional similarities, however, the Brazilian process of 
judicial selection has not been subject to anything resembling the political strife 
of its American counterpart. No one would suggest that the Brazilian system of 
judicial selection is too charged or politically partisan; on the contrary, Brazilian 
 
 100. See id. at 654. 
 101. Id.; see also Kelvin Widdows, Sir John Latham: Judicial Reasoning in Defence of the Commonwealth, 
2016 ABR 16, 42. 
 102. See Wheeler, supra note 99, at 652. 
 103. Id. at 652–53. 
 104. See, e.g., JAMES F. SIMON, THE ANTAGONISTS: HUGO BLACK, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND CIVIL 
LIBERTIES IN MODERN AMERICA 89–99 (1989) (summarizing President Roosevelt’s political alliance with 
Senator Hugo Black, as well as Roosevelt’s subsequent nomination of Black for the Supreme Court).  
 105. Keith S. Rosenn, Federalism in the Americas in Comparative Perspective, 26 U. MIAMI INTER-
AM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1994). 
 106. See generally Jacob Dolinger, The Influence of American Constitutional Law on the Brazilian Legal 
System, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 803 (1990) (explaining that America had a substantial impact on Brazilian law). 
 107. CONSTITUIҪÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] ch. 2, s. 2, art. 84, cl. 14 (Braz.).  
 108. How Does Brazil’s Justice System Actually Work?, BRAZILIAN REP. (Oct. 16, 2017), 
https://brazilian.report/guide-to-brazil/2017/10/16/brazils-justice-system-work.  
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commentators have periodically voiced the opposite complaint.109 For instance, 
Virgilío Alfonso da Silva, a constitutional law professor at the University of São 
Paulo, who wishes that the Senate would take its role in the confirmation process 
“more seriously,” contrasts the American confirmation process, which takes 
“days,” with the Brazilian process, which takes “just an afternoon.”110 This 
criticism is not ungrounded: the last time Brazil’s Senate rejected a nominee was 
in 1894.111  
This lackadaisical approach to judicial confirmations seems especially 
concerning upon consideration of the disproportionate power that Brazil’s 
mandatory retirement age can instill in certain presidents. Luiz Inácio Lula da 
Silva’s presidency is a good example of this problem. “Lula” served two terms 
as Brazil’s president, holding office from 2003 to 2010.112 During that time, 
seven ministers reached the mandatory retirement age of seventy-five, two 
retired voluntarily, and one died.113 During his tenure, Lula successfully placed 
eight ministers on the Supreme Court, and by the time he left office, six of the 
eleven ministers, a majority, were his appointees.114 By contrast, the current 
president-elect, Jair Bolsonaro, will only have two ministers reach the 
mandatory age of retirement during his four-year tenure.115 To narrow the 
difference, Bolsonaro has expressed a desire to pack the Court with 10 new 
ministers, taking the Court’s size from eleven to twenty-one.116 Regardless of 
whether Bolsonaro succeeds, the experience of Brazil indicates that this 
disparity in appointment power vests certain presidents with an arbitrarily high 
degree of control over the judiciary and ultimately makes the judiciary more 
susceptible to political encroachment. 
This is not to say that there have not been disparities amongst American 
presidents with respect to judicial appointments.117 However, the size of the 
 
 109. Jurista Critica Sabatinas de Indicados ao STF, ESTADÃO (Sept. 28, 2009), 
https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,jurista-critica-sabatinas-de-indicados-ao-stf,442224. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Maria Angela Jardim de Santa Cruz Oliveira & Nuno Garoupa, Choosing Judges in Brazil: Reassessing 
Legal Transplants from the United States, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 529, 543 (2011). 
 112. Mauricio Savarese and Jenny Barchfield, Brazilian Police Question Ex-President in Corruption Probe, 
CTV NEWS, https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/brazilian-police-question-ex-president-in-corruption-probe-
1.2803469 (last updated Mar. 4, 2016, 1:49 PM). 
 113. See Oliveira & Garoupa, supra note 111, at 542. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See Ministros: José Celso de Mello Filho, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FED., 
http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/ministro/verMinistro.asp?periodo=stf&id=28 (last visited Apr. 15, 2020) (showing 
that Minister Celso de Mello was born in 1945); see also Ministros: Marco Aurélio Mendes de Farias Mello, 
SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FED., http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/ministro/verMinistro.asp?periodo=stf&id=30 (showing 
that Minister Marco Aurélio was born in 1946). 
 116. See Maria Martha Bruno, The “Brazilian Donald Trump” Mimics Hugo Chávez in Supreme Court 
Plans, BRAZILIAN REP. (July 5, 2018), https://brazilian.report/power/2018/07/05/jair-bolsonaro-trump-chavez.  
 117. For instance, President Carter never had the opportunity to appoint a candidate for the Supreme Court. 
President Reagan, his successor, nominated four eventual justices—if one includes William Rehnquist, who 
President Reagan elevated from Associate Justice to Chief Justice. 
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disparity in Brazil, in part because of the mandatory retirement age, 118 is far 
greater than any such disparity in recent American history.119 Therefore, while 
one of the goals of a mandatory retirement age is to decrease the political stakes 
of judicial appointments, it may actually end up further politicizing the 
appointment process.  
To illustrate this concern, consider the nomination of Merrick Garland.120 
Senate Republicans refused to hold hearings for Garland in part to make the 
Supreme Court a central issue in the 2016 election, effectively encouraging 
Republican voter turnout.121 The plan worked, but it also had the consequence 
of placing the Court directly in the crosshairs of the political branches.122 
Furthermore, while there was only one seat in play for the 2016 election, it is 
easy to imagine how perception of the Court might change if voters could know 
that the next president would be responsible for filling a majority of the seats on 
the Court, as was true in Lula’s case. In Brazil, the one-party rule that 
characterized Lula’s term in office was enough to keep the judiciary relatively 
removed from partisan battles. However, in a competitive political atmosphere, 
such as that of the United States, this system could be disastrous for the judicial 
confirmation process. 
B. THE SUCCESS OF “TERM OF YEARS” TENURE LIMITS IN MEXICO 
Mexico is the best case study for the “term of years” approach because its 
constitutional structure for appointing judges is similar to that of the United 
States. The Mexican Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation (SCJN) has eleven 
ministers, all of whom were nominated by the president and confirmed by the 
Chamber of Senators, the higher body in Mexico’s bicameral legislature.123 This 
structure, of course, is quite similar to its American counterpart. The primary 
difference between the American system and the Mexican system lies in judicial 
tenure. In practice, there are several facets in which Mexico’s confirmation 
process, in practice, looks preferable to its American counterpart. At the same 
time, however, its system also illustrates some shortcomings—also having to do 
with disparities in appointment power—that the United States would do well to 
avoid, should it adopt a “term of years” approach. 
 
 118. See Oliveira & Garoupa, supra note 111, at 542. 
 119. The largest disparity in the post-World War II period is between Dwight Eisenhower, who nominated 
five Supreme Court justices, and Jimmy Carter, who did not nominate any. See Tom Murse, Which President 
Has Nominated the Most Supreme Court Justices?, THOUGHTCO., https://www.thoughtco.com/who-nominated-
more-supreme-court-justices-3880107 (last updated July 3, 2019). 
 120. See Elving, supra note 24. 
 121. Id. (“[T]he vacancy became a powerful motivator for conservative voters in the [presidential 
election] . . . . Many saw a vote for Trump as a means to keep Scalia’s seat away from the liberals.”). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, CP, Dario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], c. 
4, art. 96, 05-02-1917, últimas reformas DOF 10-02-2014 (Mex.). 
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1. Mexico Adopts “Term of Years” Tenure Limits on SCJN Ministers 
While Mexico’s confirmation process does not produce the sort of intense 
partisan fighting that one finds with American confirmation battles,124 the 
current process came into being in large part because its predecessor had come 
under intense political scrutiny.125 Throughout the 1990s, commentators became 
deeply critical of the executive branch’s overarching control of the judiciary.126 
In response to this sort of concern, in 1994, Mexico overhauled its judiciary, 
enacting a series of reforms designed to make it more independent.127 One of 
these reforms was to institute fifteen-year “term of service” tenure limits for 
Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation SCJN ministers.128 Another reform, also 
aimed at untangling the judiciary from the political branches, was to prohibit the 
president from nominating candidates who had held certain public offices in the 
year prior to nomination.129 Ironically, after Mexico adopted these reforms in 
the name of judicial independence, President Ernesto Zedillo, “dismissed” the 
then-serving ministers of the SCJN and put up his own nominations for the 
Court.130 Furthermore, because Zedillo’s political party, the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI), dominated every branch of the Mexican government 
at the time, including the Senate, he was able to reshape the Court as he saw 
fit.131 In the years after the 1994 overhaul, the Senate continued to be highly 
deferential to the president’s nominees to the SCJN, in large part because of 
single-party governance.132 
2. How Mexico Has Succeeded in Avoiding Partisan Confirmation 
Battles 
Today, the PRI no longer dominates Mexican politics as it did in the 
nineties. Currently, it only has about 16 percent of the seats in the Mexican 
Senate and no longer controls the presidency.133 Furthermore, the party currently 
in charge, the National Regeneration Movement, controls less than 50 percent 
 
 124. Robert Kossick, The Rule of Law and Development in Mexico, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 715, 753 
n.117 (2004) (“[T]he level of scrutiny received by Mexican Supreme Court nominees is nominal.”). 
 125. Alexis James Gilman, Making Amends with the Mexican Constitution: Reassessing the 1995 Judicial 
Reforms and Considering Prospects for Further Reform, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 947, 956–60 (2003) 
(summarizing Mexico’s constitutional amendments aimed at strengthening judicial independence).   
 126. See, e.g., Michael C. Taylor, Why No Rule of Law in Mexico? Explaining the Weakness of Mexico’s 
Judicial Branch, 27 N.M. L. REV. 141, 147-48 (1997); see also Alicia Ely Yamin & Pilar Noriega Garcia, The 
Absence of the Rule of Law in Mexico: Diagnosis and Implications for a Mexican Transition to Democracy, 
21 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 467, 491 (1999) (describing the judiciary as “subservien[t] to the executive 
branch”). 
 127. Gilman, supra note 125.  
 128. Id. at 957. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Luke McGrath, Presumed Guilty?: Criminal Justice and Human Rights in Mexico, 24 FORDHAM INT’L 
L.J. 801, 883 (2000). 
 131. Gilman, supra note 125, at 949–950. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Cómputos Distritales 2018, INSTITUTO NACIONAL ELECTORAL (July 8, 2018), 
https://computos2018.ine.mx/#/senadurias/nacional/1/2/1/2 (last visited Apr. 15, 2020). 
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of the Senate seats and has had to forge a coalition with the Labor Party and 
Social Encounter Party in order to secure control of the Senate.134 Despite the 
increasingly pluralistic nature of Mexican politics, however, presidents tend to 
have few problems getting their SCJN nominees confirmed. For instance, 
Norma Lucía Piña Hernández, President Peña Nieto’s most recent SCJN 
nominee, was confirmed overwhelmingly by a vote of seventy-nine to twenty, 
despite intense opposition from some in the minority Labor Party.135 There are 
three potential explanations for the Senate’s apparent willingness to confirm 
nominees. 
a. Coalition Politics 
The first explanation pertains to the Mexican Senate’s party demographics. 
Because Mexican politics have become more pluralistic in the decades since the 
reforms of 1994,136 presidents now have an incentive to consider factors beyond 
judicial philosophy and political self-interest. Consequently, a president must 
nominate candidates who appeal to senators from the various parties that 
comprise the majority coalition.137 Historically, the United States has seen a 
similar phenomenon at play when the presidency and Senate are controlled by 
different political parties. For example, Anthony Kennedy, often labeled a 
“moderate,”138 was nominated after the Senate rejected President Reagan’s first 
Supreme Court nominee, Robert Bork, on the grounds that Bork was too 
“conservative.”139 Kennedy’s nomination, then, can be understood as a sort of 
compromise with Senate Democrats. This practice seems less applicable in the 
current political climate, however. President Obama’s nomination of the 
“center-left” Merrick Garland to the Supreme Court, for instance, struck many 
as an attempt to compromise with a Republican Senate, since many regarded 
Garland as a moderate jurist.140 As previously discussed, Garland’s nomination 
did not end as President Obama had hoped.141 Given this most recent example 
and the United States’ polarized and two-party political structure, it seems 
 
 134. Adam E. Badenhorst, Mexico’s Fragile Governing Coalition, MEDIUM (July 30, 2018), 
https://medium.com/reformermag/mexicos-fragile-governing-coalition-b1dcc4bd4667.  
 135. Reed Brundage, Mexico Supreme Court: Senate Chooses Norma Piña as New Justice, MEX. VOICES 
(Dec. 10, 2015), https://mexicovoices.blogspot.com/2015/12/mexico-supreme-court-senate-chooses.html.  
 136. See Ronald F. Wright, Mexican Drug Violence and Adversarial Experiments, N.C. J. INT’L L. & 
COM. REG. 363, 379 (2010) (“The loss of the PRI monopoly on political power with the election of Vicente Fox 
in 2000 signaled the arrival of a more pluralistic and democratically competitive nation.”). 
 137. See id. 
 138. See, e.g., Colin Dwyer, A Brief History of Anthony Kennedy’s Swing Vote—and the Landmark Cases 
It Swayed, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 27, 2018, 7:00 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/27/623943443/a-brief-
history-of-anthony-kennedys-swing-vote-and-the-landmark-cases-it-swayed.  
 139. See, e.g., Against Robert Bork; His Bill of Rights Is Different, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 1987), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1987/10/05/opinion/against-robert-bork-his-bill-of-rights-is-different.html.  
 140. See, e.g., Nate Silver, Republicans Could Do a Lot Worse Than Merrick Garland Under President 
Clinton—or President Trump, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Mar. 16, 2016, 3:42 PM), 
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/republicans-could-do-a-lot-worse-than-merrick-garland-under-president-
clinton-or-president-trump.  
 141. See Howe, supra note 12. 
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unlikely that the sort of broad, coalition-style nominations that play well in 
Mexico will find much political success in the United States. It is certainly 
conceivable that the nomination of a “moderate” candidate early in a president’s 
term could be confirmed by a Senate controlled by an opposing party, but, 
generally speaking, the president likely needs a friendly Senate in order to get 
nominees confirmed. 
b. Jurisprudencia in Mexico’s Civil Law System 
The second explanation, which is clearly inapplicable to the United States, 
concerns the nature of judicial review in Mexico. In the United States, the 
principle that lower courts are bound by the Supreme Court’s resolution of a 
particular constitutional issue is fundamental.142 In Mexico, the SCJN’s 
resolution of a particular dispute between two parties is, at least initially, only 
binding upon the litigants before the Court.143 To create jurisprudencia in 
Mexico (that is, to create precedent that binds all state and federal courts), eight 
ministers of the SCJN must rule on a particular question of law and then uphold 
the decision with “five consecutive and consistent decisions.”144 This 
requirement of five consecutive and consistent decisions constitutes one of the 
starker differences between the function of the United States Supreme Court and 
Mexico’s SCJN. It also likely contributes to the comparatively relaxed approach 
that the Mexican Senate takes with respect to the president’s SCJN nominations.  
As an illustrative example, consider the permissibility of recreational 
cannabis as a legal and political issue. In October 2018, the SCJN issued two 
rulings that recognized cannabis use as part of the “fundamental right to the free 
development of personality” guaranteed by the Mexican Constitution.145 
However, the issue of recreational cannabis had been litigated before the SCJN 
for years prior to these rulings.146 2015 marked the first time that the Court 
invalidated a cannabis prohibition on constitutional grounds.147 On first glance, 
it is not at all clear that there was any social consensus that cannabis 
 
 142. Winslow v. F.E.R.C., 587 F.3d 1133, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“Vertical stare decisis—both in letter and 
in spirit—is a critical aspect of our hierarchical Judiciary headed by ‘one supreme Court.’”). 
 143. See Patrick Del Duca, The Rule of Law: Mexico’s Approach to Expropriation Disputes in the Face of 
Investment Globalization, 51 UCLA L. REV. 35, 101–02 (2003). 
 144. See Kossick, supra note 124, at 770 n.187. 
 145. See Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, Reitera Primera Sala Inconstitucionalidad De La 
Prohibición Absoluta Del Consumo Recreativo De Marihuana E Integra Jurisprudencia (Oct. 31, 2018), 
http://www.internet2.scjn.gob.mx/red2/comunicados/noticia.asp?id=5785; see also Christopher Ingraham, 
Mexico’s Supreme Court Overturns Country’s Ban on Recreational Marijuana, WASH. POST (Nov. 1, 2018, 
12:04 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/11/01/mexicos-supreme-court-overturns-
countrys-recreational-marijuana-ban/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.a7437b5dc8b2.  
 146. See, e.g., Carrie Kahn, Mexico’s Supreme Court Ruling Paves Way for Precedent on Marijuana 
Legalization, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 5, 2015, 4:38 PM), https://www.npr.org/2015/11/05/454907637/ 
mexicos-supreme-court-ruling-paves-way-for-precedent-on-marijuana-legalization.  
 147. Elisabeth Malkin & Azam Ahmed, Ruling in Mexico Sets Into Motion Legal Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/05/world/americas/mexico-supreme-court-marijuana-
ruling.html.  
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decriminalization was sound policy,148 much less a legal consensus that the 
Mexican Constitution contained a fundamental right to use cannabis for 
recreational purposes. There were at least some, including political leaders,149 
religious readers,150 and advocacy groups, like the National Union of Parents,151 
for whom the prospect of SCJN ministers invalidating criminal prohibitions on 
cannabis was troubling. Interestingly, however, the two ministers who delivered 
the opinions creating jurisprudencia on this issue were confirmed by large 
margins in the Senate. The first was Norma Lucía Piña Hernández, who, as 
previously mentioned, was confirmed with 79 votes in the Senate.152 The second, 
Minister Arturo Zaldívar Lelo de Larrea, was nominated in 2009 and received 
90 votes in the Senate.153 To the degree that the five-decision restriction limits 
the SCJN’s capacity to set binding precedent with national public policy 
implications, it makes sense that the stakes for each SCJN nominee are lower 
than they might be in absence of the restriction. 
Contrast Mexico’s jurisprudencia with judicial review in the United States. 
The U.S. Supreme Court, like the SCJN, also passes on legal issues that have 
national policy ramifications.154 The difference between the two is that the 
Supreme Court’s decisions are binding, regardless of whether the Court is 
considering an issue for the first time or reaffirming a centuries-old principle.155 
In certain cases, the justices have been quite candid in acknowledging the ease 
with which the Supreme Court can overrule precedent, as well as the ways in 
which this reality can impact the politics of judicial selection.156 The Mexican 
 
 148. See, e.g., Vanda Felbab-Brown, Why Legalization in Mexico Is Not a Panacea for Reducing Violence 
and Suppressing Organized Crime, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Sept. 23, 2010), https://www.brookings.edu/ 
opinions/why-legalization-in-mexico-is-not-a-panacea-for-reducing-violence-and-suppressing-organized-
crime (“[T]here are good reasons not to want the very bloody Mexican capos to become legitimized.”). 
 149. See Malka Levitin, Mexican Supreme Court Inches Toward Marijuana Legalization, 
COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT’L L., http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/jtl/mexican-supreme-court-inches-toward-
marijuana-legalization/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2020) (“The president of Mexico, Enrique Pena Nieto, is still 
opposed to the legalization of marijuana, as are many politicians.”). 
 150. See, e.g., David Agren, Mexico Supreme Court Rules Ban on Marijuana Use Unconstitutional, 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 4, 2015, 5:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/04/mexico-supreme-court-
recreational-marijuana-legal (discussing the Archdiocese of Mexico City’s opposition to the SCJN’s decision to 
remove the legalization debate from the legislature, “as if it’s a super power.”). 
 151. See Dudley Althaus, Mexico’s Supreme Court Rules in Favor of Personal Marijuana Use, WALL ST. 
J. (Nov. 4, 2015, 5:05 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/mexicos-supreme-court-rules-in-favor-of-personal-
marijuana-use-1446670474?alg=y (“This issue should be decided by Congress.”). 
 152. See Brundage, supra note 135. 
 153. Claudia Guerrero & Rolando Herrera, Avala el Senado Relevos en la Corte; Obtienen Respaldo del 
PRI, PAN y PRD. Sustituye Zaldívar a Genaro Góngora y Aguilar a Azuela en el Poder Judicial, EL NORTE 
(Dec. 2, 2009). 
 154. See Eric Black, How the Supreme Court Has Come to Play a Policymaking Role, MINNPOST (Nov. 20, 
2012), https://www.minnpost.com/eric-black-ink/2012/11/how-supreme-court-has-come-play-policymaking-
role. 
 155. See, e.g., Alshrafi v. Am. Airlines, 321 F. Supp. 2d 150, 156 n.7 (D. Mass. 2004) (“The sweeping 
nature of recent Supreme Court preemption jurisprudence has been the subject of considerable comment, much 
of it critical. . . . Still, it is bedrock that Supreme Court decisions bind the analysis of [lower courts].”). 
 156. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 883, 943 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part) 
(“In one sense, the Court’s approach is worlds apart from that of [the dissent] . . . . And yet, in another sense, 
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approach to jurisprudencia, like the coalition-style politics that currently 
dominate the Mexican Senate, finds no resonating parallel in the United States.  
c. Fifteen-Year SCJN Terms: A Model for the United States? 
A third explanation, which is most easily applicable to the United States 
and most pertinent to the topic of this Note, is that the stakes of each particular 
nomination are lower when there is a fixed tenure ceiling for each nominee. As 
mentioned previously, the average length of tenure for a Supreme Court Justice 
in the modern era is in excess of twenty-six years.157 This aggravates already 
existing partisan attitudes about the Supreme Court in two ways. First, the 
twenty-six-year average creates high stakes for nominations simply by virtue of 
its length. A confirmation vote is an important decision that senators make with 
imperfect information about the nominee,158 and the stakes are higher than if the 
nominee were slated to sit on the Court for a shorter period of time than a likely 
twenty-six years.  
Second, and perhaps more dangerous, is the uncertainty that comes with 
“good behavior” tenure. Given the Supreme Court’s increasingly central role in 
deciding issues of public policy,159 the public has taken a strong interest in the 
composition of the Court.160 While this is certainly understandable, it has also 
given rise to a curious and even disturbing infatuation with the mortality of the 
Court’s members.161 Almost inevitably, each summer brings with it a series of 
rumors and speculation concerning the possible retirement of at least one elderly 
justice, lest he or she die in office and be replaced by a president with differing 
opinions about the law, thereby shifting the ideological balance of the Court.162 
 
the distance between the two approaches is short—the distance is but a single vote. . . . I cannot remain on this 
Court forever, and when I do step down, the confirmation process for my successor may well focus on the issue 
[of abortion].”). 
 157. Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 40, at 778. 
 158. Oliver Roeder, Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings Have More Questions and Fewer Answers Than 
Ever Before, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Sept. 4, 2018, 5:58 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/supreme-court-
confirmation-hearings-have-more-questions-and-fewer-answers-than-ever-before (“[Supreme Court] nominees 
have nearly perfected the sport of confirmation-hearing dodgeball, ducking and weaving through the thousands 
of comments.”).  
 159. See Black, supra note 154. 
 160. See Voter Enthusiasm at Record High in Nationalized Midterm Environment, supra note 27. 
 161. See, e.g., Oliver Roeder, How Long Will the Supreme Court’s Conservative Bloc Survive?, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (July 19, 2018, 5:59 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-long-will-the-supreme-
courts-conservative-bloc-survive/; see also SCOTUS DEATHWATCH, http://scotusdeathwatch.com/ (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2020); see also Chris Kirk & Stephen Laniel, The Supreme Court Justice Death Calculator, SLATE 
(Jan. 14, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/01/ 
supreme_court_justice_death_calculator_find_out_the_probabilities_that_different.html.  
 162. See, e.g., Melissa Quinn, Mike Lee: “Very Real Possibility” Justice Antony Kennedy Retires This Year, 
WASH. EXAMINER (May 23, 2018, 10:21 AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/courts/ 
mike-lee-very-real-possibility-justice-anthony-kennedy-retires-this-year (“[H]e considers himself a Republican, 
and with all things being equal, would prefer to be replaced by a Republican president.”); see also Jonathan 
Turley, Opinion: Ginsburg Gambled to Stay and Now She May Lose Her Legacy, HILL (Apr. 10, 2017, 4:00 
PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/the-judiciary/328151-ginsburg-gambled-to-stay-on-the-supreme-
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The annual fixation with who might leave the Court and what impact that would 
have on its balance regularly drums up partisan attitudes about the judiciary.163 
It tends not to help that the end of the term, which is when this morbid 
speculation reaches its peak intensity, also happens to coincide with the release 
of the Court’s “most important” decisions for the term.164 
Mexico does not have this annual uncertainty because the ministers of the 
SCJN have fixed terms. It may well be true that not every minister serves his or 
her fifteen years to completion. However, one of the purported benefits of 
establishing fifteen-year terms was greater predictability in the composition and 
turnover of the SCJN.165 From 1947 to 1994, for instance, Mexico did not 
employ the “term of years” approach it currently uses; rather, it employed a 
mandatory retirement age of seventy.166 Because of the wide availability of 
attractive non-judicial positions in the government, fifty-five percent of SCJN 
ministers left the bench after serving ten years or less.167 Some commentators 
thought that the fifteen-year terms instituted in 1994 would result in more 
ministers completing the term of service, thereby instituting a more spread-out, 
consistent rate of turnover.168 A chaotic, uneven rate of turnover, by contrast, 
seems to inherently produce uncertainty. Granted, in pre-1994 Mexico, this 
uncertainty did not result in particularly high stakes for judicial selection, since 
the likelihood of a minister remaining on the SCJN for decades was 
comparatively low.169 In the United States, however, the opposite is true. 
Because turnover is not easily predictable and because terms are so long, the 
political stakes of each nomination are high. Since no one knows when another 
vacancy on the Court will open, presidents and senators feel a great deal of 
pressure to treat vacancies as important political battles. A set term of years 
would help resolve this uncertainty in large part. 
  
 
court-now-she-may (“What began as polite suggestions that it ‘might be time [for Justice Ginsburg] to leave’ 
became more and more pointed, if not panicked, in the last two years of the Obama term.”). 
 163. See, e.g., Janice Williams, Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy Retirement Rumors Has 
Washington on Edge for Next Term, NEWSWEEK (June 24, 2017, 12:47 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/ 
anthony-kennedy-supreme-court-retirement-628842; see also Tony Mauro, Rehnquist Retirement Rumors Flare 
Up and Go Out Again; Courtside, RECORDER (June 10, 2002), at 3 (“The story [that Justice Rehnquist was going 
to retire] was whipping around Washington, feeding on itself, and you could almost hear interest groups dusting 
off their battle gear for a confirmation battle.”). 
 164. Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law Students: The End of the Term, SCOTUSBLOG (June 18, 2016, 
9:17 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/scotus-for-law-students-the-end-of-the-term/.  
 165. Héctor Fix-Fierro, Judicial Reform and the Supreme Court of Mexico: The Trajectory of Three Years, 
6 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 1, 6 n.28 (1998). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. HÉCTOR FIX-ZAMUDIO & JOSÉ RAMÓN COSSÍO DÍAZ, EL PODER JUDICIAL EN EL ORDENAMIENTO 
MEXICANO 630–33 (1996). 
 169. Fix-Fierro, supra note 165, at 6 n.28. 
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3. The Need for Staggered Terms: Lessons from Mexico’s Disparities in 
Presidential Appointment Power 
Having identified one positive aspect of Mexico’s judicial selection 
process that would be applicable in the United States (by way of a Twenty-
Eighth Amendment), it is also worth noting that the “term of years” approach 
may help to alleviate some of the partisanship now inherent in the process. 
Unfortunately, this solution could also have the undesired effect of producing 
large disparities in nominating power for subsequent presidents, which is part of 
what makes the Brazilian model so undesirable.170 A brief examination of the 
current composition of the SCJN makes this problem more apparent.  
Because President Zedillo nominated a wave of ministers at once in 
1994,171 each minister’s tenure was set to the same term-of-years clock, so to 
speak. Theoretically, this would mean that Zedillo and the president who serves 
fifteen years after Zedillo would each have the opportunity to fill the entire 
composition of the Court, with no intermediate vacancies for other presidents to 
fill (assuming each minister serves the entire fifteen-year term). Fortunately, this 
has not been the case, as not every minister has served the full term.172 However, 
the appointment disparity is borne out by the current SCJN, which contains 5 
ministers nominated by Filipe Calderón,173 who served from 2006 to 2012,174 
and only three ministers by Enrique Peña Nieto,175 the following president, 
whose term ran from 2012 to 2018.176 By contrast, the current president, Andrés 
Manuel López Obrador, whose term will be six years,177 will have the 
opportunity to nominate ministers for at least six vacancies178: as of November 
2019, he had already appointed two ministers,179 one minister had resigned,180 
and three of the current ministers, Fernando Franco González-Salas,181 Arturo 
 
 170. Oliveira & Garoupa, supra note 111, at 542–43. 
 171. McGrath, supra note 130, at 883. 
 172. See, e.g., All Power: López Obrador’s Attempts to Seize the Supreme Court, CE NOTICIAS FINANCIERAS 
ENGLISH (Oct. 4, 2019) (describing Eduardo Medina-Mora’s resignation from the SCJN). 
 173. See Conoce la Corte, SUPREMA CORTE DE JUSTICIA DE LA NACIÓN, https://www.scjn.gob.mx/conoce-
la-corte (last visited Apr. 15, 2020). 
 174. See List of Presidents of Mexico, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/list-
of-presidents-of-Mexico-1830608 (last visited Apr. 15, 2020). 
 175. See Conoce la Corte, supra note 173. 
 176. See List of Presidents of Mexico, supra note 174. 
 177. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, CP, Dario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], c. 
4, art. 83, 05-02-1917, últimas reformas DOF 10-02-2014 (Mex.). 
 178. This assumes that all present ministers serve out their full terms. 
 179. See Juan Luis González Alcántara Carrancá Is Welcomed at the SCJN, CE NOTICIAS FINANCIERAS 
ENGLISH (Jan. 2, 2019). 
 180. See All Power: López Obrador’s Attempts to Seize the Supreme Court, supra note 172. 
 181. See SCJN: Why It Anticipates That It Will Be a Woman to Replace Medina Mora, CE NOTICIAS 
FINANCIERAS ENGLISH (Oct. 4, 2019) (“[T]he ministers are elected to a 15-year commission, so the next outing 
would be that of José Fernando Franco González-Salas, nominated by Vicente Fox in December 2006.”). 
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Zaldívar Lelo de Larrea,182 and Luis María Aguilar Morales,183 will each hit their 
fifteen-year limits before López Albrador’s term expires in 2024. Certainly, this 
is less dramatic than the disparities present in the Brazilian judicial selection.184 
However, if the goal is to reduce the levels of partisanship and political strife 
that currently infect the process, the ideal solution should allocate opportunities 
for presidents to nominate candidates on a roughly equal basis. 
The problem of disparity in nominating power would perhaps best be 
addressed by staggering the fixed terms at the outset. This illustrates an 
important strength of the approach advanced by Professors Steven Calabresi and 
James Lindgren.185 The Calabresi-Lindgren model proposes eighteen-year terms 
with appointments staggered every two years.186 This has two positive effects. 
First, it guards against disparity in nominating power by granting each president 
the opportunity to nominate at least two candidates to the Supreme Court per 
term. If a president wins two terms in office, then the president will have four 
opportunities to nominate a candidate. Therefore, while a one-term president 
will have half as many opportunities to fill vacancies as a two-term president, 
this will solely be a reflection of the president’s extended time in office, 
reflecting public support. This is to be contrasted with the Brazilian and Mexican 
systems—as well as, to a certain degree, the current American system—in which 
the president’s influence on the high court is determined by more arbitrary 
factors, such as the death or retirement of a sitting member. Furthermore, in the 
event of a premature end to a justice’s tenure, be it death or early retirement, the 
Calabresi-Lindgren approach affords presidents the opportunity to make an 
interim nomination, also subject to advice and consent of the Senate.187 
Therefore, while some presidents will have slight advantages in nominating 
power over others, the advantage is limited to the remainder of the original 
eighteen-year term, and importantly, no president will be denied the opportunity 
to fill at least two full vacancies. 
Second, it reduces the political pressure to select (or block) nominees on 
strictly ideological grounds. Of course, the Senate should not be unduly 
deferential towards the president’s nominations in any instance, and it would be 
a dereliction of the Senate’s duty if it simply rubber-stamped nominees who 
lacked sufficient credentials, held ideas far outside the mainstream, or exhibited 
serious character flaws. However, any purely partisan confirmations would 
likely be offset over time, assuming at least some change in party control of the 
White House and the Senate. The hope, then, is that the participants in the 
 
 182. See Ministros Eligen Hoy a Presidente de la Suprema Corte, EXCELSIOR (Feb. 1, 2019, 8 :31 PM), 
https://www.excelsior.com.mx/nacional/ministros-eligen-hoy-a-presidente-de-la-suprema-corte/1287982 (“Su 
periodo finaliza el 30 de noviembre de 2024,” which translates to “Its period ends on November 30, 2024.”). 
 183. See The New Minister of the Court will be Decisive to Choose the Head of the PJF, CE NOTICIAS 
FINANCIERAS ENGLISH (Aug. 26, 2018) (“[Aguilar Morales’s] term as minister ends [in] 2024.”). 
 184. See Oliveira & Garoupa, supra note 111, at 542. 
 185. Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 40, at 824. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 827. 
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confirmation process place greater emphasis on each nominee’s competence to 
serve on the Court and less emphasis on political gamesmanship. 
CONCLUSION  
It would be naïve to reduce any existing problems with judicial selection 
to a single factor or to argue that a modest alteration to the process would remove 
partisanship from the nomination and confirmation process. As acknowledged 
from the outset, politics have always crept into the confirmation process. That 
said, there are degrees of politicization, and when the process becomes as toxic 
and divisive as it has in recent years in the United States, the underlying causes 
ought to be addressed.  
There is some reason to think that the current practice of life tenure is a 
contributing factor to the current climate in the judicial selection process. 
Decades-long terms with no fixed end date incentivizes political actors to treat 
Supreme Court vacancies as political contests. This is not a strictly theoretical 
point. Just as other nations have largely abandoned the practice of life tenure, 
they have also, in many instances, avoided the toxic partisanship that surrounds 
the judicial selection process in the United States. While a number of structural 
and political factors account for the difference, the experiences of other countries 
tend to suggest that a modest reduction in judicial tenure would have some 
positive effects. The Brazilian experience with mandatory retirement cautions 
against a mandatory retirement age, but the Mexican experience with a fixed 
term of years is encouraging. Given these observations, the United States would 
do well to consider a Twenty-Eighth Amendment that restricted Supreme Court 
tenure to eighteen years. Mexico is also illustrative of the discrepancies in 
appointment power that can result from a term of years system. To account for 
this, the terms ought to be staggered every two years, thereby guaranteeing each 
president two complete vacancies and the possibility of one or more interim 
vacancies. 
 
